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Overview

This paper details some of the innovative methods that the Papua New Guinea Financial
Intelligence Unit has developed using anti-money laundering legislation to address
large-scale grand corruption.
In an environment where many Government systems are affected by corruption, these
methods have had a measure of success where other changes attempted have had a more
limited impact.
It is likely that the problems experienced by Papua New Guinea are also seen in other
developing countries and, as such, these processes are presented here in the hope that
they may be of interest to other countries battling corruption. Equally, they are
hopefully of interest to those working in the field of forensic accounting research and
teaching, as it is in this context that Forensic Accounting may potentially be able to
make a direct and real contribution toward the alleviation of poverty and suffering in
developing countries.

About the Authors

Federal Agent John Chevis is a member of the Australian Federal Police. John holds a
Bachelor of Commerce Accountancy and Economics, qualified as a CPA in 2000 and
was awarded a Masters of Forensic Accounting in 2009. As part of the AFP

Page | 3

International Deployment Group, John was advisor to the Papua New Guinea Financial
Intelligence Unit (PNGFIU) from May 2009 to August 2011.
Detective Senior Sergeant Bernard Barrum is the Officer-In-Charge (OIC) of the
PNGFIU. Bernard has over 30 years experience in the Royal Papua New Guinea
Constabulary, 21 of those years specialising in fraud and corruption investigation.
Bernard has been the OIC of PNGFIU since its inception in 2007.

PNG – A Brief History and Description

Papua New Guinea (PNG) is an independent1 country of approximately 6.8 million
people (World Bank, 2009), occupying the Eastern half of the island of New Guinea.
PNG is richly endowed with natural resources but has an under-developed economy
leaving it ranked 137 out of 169 countries in the 2010 United Nations Development
Programme, Human Development Index (UNDP, 2010) the second lowest in the AsiaPacific Region. In 1996, the latest date for available information, 57.4% of the PNG
population were estimated to be living on less than US$2 a day (World Bank, 1996)
with about 87 % living in rural areas in an agricultural subsistence lifestyle.(CIA World
Factbook)
In 2008 only 33 % of the rural population were estimated to have access to an adequate
water supply (World Bank, 2008) and over half of the population did not have access to
adequate sanitation. (World Bank, 2008)
1

PNG achieved independence in 1975, having been variously under French, German, UK and Australian
since 1885
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Politics

Politics in Papua New Guinea are highly competitive but fractured down ethnic lines
with many members of parliament elected on a personal or ethnic basis rather than as a
result of ideological or party affiliation. There are several political parties, however
party allegiances are unreliable, and winning candidates are often courted (and it is
alleged, bribed) in efforts to forge the majority needed to form a Government.
It has been observed by Transparency International that a significant number of
politicians (or potential politicians) view political life in terms of the opportunity for
self enrichment. „Contesting elections has become a god-sent opportunity to wealth
creation…most medium scale business activities in PNG are owned by politicians and
ex-politicians” (Transparency International, 2003)
Allegations exist of vote buying and of public servants funding election campaigns
involving vote buying from corrupt activities undertaken while in Government
employment.

Economy
The PNG Government Budget for 2011 was approximately K9.328 billion (O‟Neill,
2010) (AUD 3.886 billion) of which K7.331 billion (AUD3.054 billion) is sourced from
taxation revenue with the balance coming from resources. In 2009 Gross Domestic
Product was estimated at US$7.89 billion (K18 billion) (World Bank, World
Development Indicators, 2009 ) and a GDP per capita estimated at US$1,172 for the
same year.
In 2011-12 it is estimated that Papua New Guinea will receive AUD482.3 million in
Official Development Assistance from Australia (Ausaid) (Ausaid, 2011) which
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represents approximately 6% of GDP.

Corruption
Corruption in Papua New Guinea is generally perceived to be systemic and systematic.
There is barely a day goes by when the print media, radio and television news don‟t
mention corruption as a topic. The 2010 Transparency International Corruption
Perception Index (CPI) ranked Papua New Guinea at 154 out of 178 (Transparency
International, 2010) surveyed countries, with a score of 2.1.2 this ranks Papua New
Guinea equal with countries such as Kenya, Congo, Russia, Laos and Cambodia and
below countries such as Indonesia, India, Colombia and Mexico.

Perhaps the most definitive indication of the scale of corruption in PNG comes from the
Papua New Guinea Parliamentary Public Accounts Committee (PPAC) Inquiry. The
PPAC is (at the time of writing) conducting inquiries into the public accounts from the
years 2004 onwards. The Inquiry‟s latest available report, released in 20093, covers the
Public Accounts for 2006. In this report the PPAC states:

 (The) collapse of accountability and responsible, lawful and competent fiscal
management was, and remains, a direct threat to the viability and civil stability
of the Nation and the health and welfare of our citizens; (p1)
 There (is) a culture of impunity (where) fiscal mishandling and
misappropriation has prospered .... There is, no fear or risk of detection or
2

CPI score relates to perceptions of the degree of corruption as seen by business people and country analysts, and
ranges between 10 (highly clean) and 0 (highly corrupt).
3
The PPAC is known to have released a report in 2011 into the accounts for 2007 but this report is not yet available
on the Parliamentary website.
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punishment for those who would act illegally with public funds; ( p2)
 The Department of Finance, (has) arrogated to itself sovereign power over the
use and application of public monies, often in open defiance of Government
appropriation, policy and directive. .... and intentionally refused to render
account or assistance to this Parliament. ( p4)


The failure of service and development delivery will, and has already, resulted
in significant social unrest. In other words, the loss of Parliamentary power and
fiscal control, and thereby policy implementation, has created an increasingly
angry, impoverished and disillusioned citizenry, deprived of the services that
they have the right to receive ( p5)



(There) is no detectable will or ability in the Public Service – particularly in the
Department of Finance – to change or reform. The huge amounts of money
misappropriated in that Department clearly displace any ability or wish to
change or to comply with the duties imposed on that Department; ( p6)

 Illegal and/or and improper practices (are) rife - particularly in the very
Department responsible for fiscal management, the Department of Finance, but
also across the entire spectrum of Government at every level – National,
Provincial and Local. .... Governments and law enforcement agencies failed to
grapple with the problem and this failure emboldened the misusers, who moved
in a few years from small scale opportunistic misappropriation to the organized
diversion of huge sums of public money – with apparent immunity and impunity.
( p11)
 misappropriation, theft, misapplication, fraud and illegal and improper handling
of public monies (have) become an incident of Governance in Papua New
Guinea; (p157)
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This Committee has made many referrals in the past four years with no action
taken by any law enforcement agency and if we were to refer accountable Public
Servants for failure to perform their duty or fiscal mismanagement, there would
scarcely be an officer who would remain. .... The Royal Papua New Guinea
Constabulary seems incapable or unwilling or both of investigating or
prosecuting complex fiscal crime .... The very culture of impunity that we have
identified in this Report means that any referral by us would be a hollow gesture
– and it is high time that the National Parliament realized the extent and terrible
effect that this collapse of law enforcement has had on our National Institutions
( p173)

The PPAC report into the 2006 accounts is 178 pages and ends with the following;
The National Parliament must address this National state of failure immediately.
The future, viability and reputation of the Government of Papua New Guinea
and the welfare of its citizens demand it.

The claim that malfeasance there is “a direct threat to the viability and civil stability of
the Nation and the health and welfare of its citizens” appears to indicate that the losses
observed are significant. Estimations of quite how significant those losses are range
from about 10% of the Government budget in 2002 (Holden et al, 2003) to 50% of the
Government budget in 2010 (Radio New Zealand, 17 Feb 2011) (The National 17 Feb
2011) (Post Courier 16 Feb 2011) equivalent to about 20% of GDP.

Further indications of the quantum of fraud and corruption are provided by such reports
as the 14 July, 2011 announcement by the RPNGC that it was commencing an
investigation into the alleged misapplication of K1.9 billion (AUD 700 million) of the
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development budget (equivalent to 20% of the total Government budget) by the former
secretary of National Planning paid out over three months to June 2011. (The National,
July 14, 2011)

Background on the Papua New Guinea Financial Intelligence Unit
The authors‟ recent involvement in combating corruption in PNG arose out of their
placement in the PNG Financial Intelligence Unit (PNGFIU). One, as the Officer-InCharge, and the other, as an Adviser to the PNGFIU under the Papua New GuineaAustralia Policing Partnership.
The PNGFIU was created within the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary, PNG‟s
National Police Force, by Section 13 of the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA) 2005. It has
an approved organisational strength of 6 members but actual strength had not exceeded
4 members in the two years to July 2011. It was established on 16 July 2007 and
commenced operations in November 2007 with its functions detailed in the POCA
which positions the PNGFIU as the AML/CTF regulator and supervisor. Among its
functions are the requirement to train Cash Dealers, conduct investigations, issue
guidelines, compile statistics, make recommendations, advise the Minister and receive
and analyse financial intelligence.
The legislation which created the PNGFIU, was introduced in 2005 as part of a package
of 3 Acts to give effect to PNG‟s obligations under certain declarations4 by the South
Pacific Forum (SPF) on law enforcement cooperation to combat transnational crime. It

4

Declaration by the South Pacific Forum on Law Enforcement Cooperation ( the Honiara declaration) 1992, & the
Nasonini Declaration on Regional Security adopting the FATF 40 recommendations.
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was not enacted to combat domestic corruption or prevent other domestic financially
motivated crime but was part of a broader promulgation of FATF recommendations in
many countries around the world –recommendations that were originally drawn up in
1990 „as an initiative to combat the misuse of financial systems by persons laundering
drug money‟ (FATF, 2003) and are only relatively recently being viewed (and
reviewed) in light of their potential use in the fight against corruption.5
The drafting of Papua New Guinea‟s POCA was based upon a generic proceeds of
crime Act6 (somewhat) tailored to PNG conditions, such as they were then understood,
by the Papua New Guinea Director of Public Prosecutions, with the assistance of a
deputy commissioner of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary7.
If the PNG POCA has limitations they perhaps arise from its inception as a tool to
prevent PNG financial systems from being used to launder drug money from other
countries. 8Issues such as focus on “cash transactions” and “Cash Dealers” for example,
ignores the fact that much of the grand corruption in PNG is conducted using
government cheques. Similarly suspicious transaction reporting under the PNG POCA
requires Cash Dealers who have reasonable grounds to suspect that information that
they hold may be;

5

In 2010 FATF produced a reference guide to on the use of the FATF Recommendations to support the fight against
Corruption in response to a request by G20 leaders to the FATF to help detect and deter the proceeds of corruption
by strengthening the FATF Recommendations
6

Produced for the Pacific Islands Legal Officers Network with assistance from the Australian Attorney-General‟s

Criminal Justice Division, and the Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing.
7

8

Information provided to PNGFIU by PNG Department of Justice 31 May 2011
the same observation perhaps could be made of the FATF Recommendations themselves.
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„relevant to the investigation or prosecution of a person for a serious offence, it
must take measures to find out: the purpose of the transaction; the origin of the
funds; and where the funds will be sent‟
This appears to assume that the money is merely transiting the customer‟s account and
furthermore may be read to suggest a level of implied passivity on the part of the Cash
Dealer in with respect to their identification of such suspicious transactions.
Additionally, the Section may be read to suggest that the Cash Dealer need not ensure
that the source and application of the funds is consistent with their knowledge of the
customer.
Also, the Act‟s focus on “proceeds of crime” potentially hinders the prevention of
corruption where the criminality presents during the disbursement of the funds as
opposed to being apparent at during its placement into the financial system. Such a
situation might exist where, for example, a deposit is made of a large Government
cheque for an infrastructure project into a company account followed by large
disbursements into accounts controlled by public servants employed by the department
issuing the cheque or large cash withdrawals made in locations geographically distant
from the stated location of the project.
These issues with the legislation could clearly be addressed through amendment.
Ongoing political issues however have resulted in the Parliament of Papua New Guinea
sitting for less than 60 days in the period from December 2009 to July 2011. Little in
the way of legislation of any type was passed during this time and unfortunately,
examples of legislation proposed over the last 2 years would tend to indicate a
legislature interested in curtailing the effectiveness of oversight bodies such as the
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Ombudsman Commission (and by implication, probably the PNGFIU) rather than
enhancing anti-corruption processes.

The Fraud Triangle at Work ?
Exactly why Papua New Guinea is suffering such high levels of corruption is difficult to
explain. The proximate cause for the losses to fraud and corruption are perhaps best
described by the former Treasury and Finance Minister, now Prime Minister Peter
O‟Neill, when in May 2011 he was quoted as speaking of “the systematic breakdown in
the public service” (Kolma, 2011). The ultimate cause however may be far more
complex and possibly due to cultural and historical influences upon which Donald R.
Cressey‟s „Fraud Triangle‟ potentially sheds some light.
The average wage for a public servant in PNG, including police officers, is
approximately K23,000 per annum with many private sector employees such as bank
employees earning not much more. This disparity between the cost of living and
salaries, coupled with family or „wantok‟ obligations, appears to place many public
servants in a situation where the temptation to engage in corrupt behavior to supplement
income is likely to far outweigh any individual considerations of integrity.

The Fraud Triangle suggests there are three factors likely to be present in every situation
of fraud:



Motive (or pressure) – the need for committing fraud (need for money, etc.);



Rationalization – the mindset of the fraudster that justifies them to commit
fraud; and
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Opportunity – the situation that enables fraud to occur (often when internal
controls are weak or non-existent).

Wolfe and Hermanson (2004) add to the triangle a fourth element, that being
„Capability‟ – the necessary traits and abilities to commit the fraud.

An examination of the circumstances of many Papua New Guinean public servants
shows that many of them are in situations where at least the first three factors are
present - Low relative wages and family pressures providing the motive for fraud. A
rationalisation that „everyone else is doing it‟ or „if I don‟t take it someone else will‟,
and lax governance, poor oversight and a less than diligent banking sector providing
ample opportunity.
The lens of the fraud triangle/diamond undoubtedly provides useful insights into
individual instances of fraud which is certainly useful when applied on an
organizational level to prevent fraud. The application of such insights, on a macro or
country level, to provide effective methods of countering widespread corruption
however appear less certain.

In formulating methods for the PNGFIU to counter corruption the authors‟ observed
that there was little that they could achieve in the terms altering the environment to
reduce motive, or capability. Reducing „motive‟ would most likely require an increase
in public service salary, a reduction in the cost of living and alteration of cultural norms
to reduce „wantok‟ obligations – all unfortunately outside the capacity of the authors.
Reducing „capability‟ as regards and individuals‟ personal abilities would appear to be
an impossibility and/or counter- productive, as those capable of engaging in corruption
are also likely to be the most capable workers.
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The theoretical basis for the actions taken by the authors over the past two years have,
as a consequence, focused on altering the „rationalisation‟ of fraud by reducing the
perception that corruption is going unnoticed and increasing the deterrent through
increasing the perceived risk of being detected. With this went a focus on reducing
„opportunity‟ through a restriction of the avenues to place the proceeds into the banking
system. „Opportunity‟ certainly presents itself regularly to public servants in terms of
poor legislative control, lax governance and poor management oversight. There is little
on this side of the equation, however, that offered an apparent, viable solution in the
short term.

Using AML Legislation to Address Corruption

The solutions developed in the PNGFIU using the AML legislation provided in the
POCA. They were „flag shipped‟ by two processes; one to raise the perceived risk of
being detected or caught, and another other to reduce opportunity to place funds into the
banking system. They were a departure from traditional methods of dealing with
corruption in PNG which would typically be based upon deterrence through
investigating and prosecuting offenders. The methods themselves are described below,
but it is perhaps worth noting a couple of points about the POCA and the PNG
environment prior to discussing them.
The POCA‟s stated purpose is to provide measures against “money laundering”, and to
„deprive persons of the proceeds of, and benefits derived from, the commission of
offences‟ (Proceeds of Crime Act 2005 Preamble)
The impetus for criminals to launder money, that is, hide or obfuscate the illegitimate
source of funds however, only occurs when the offender perceives a reasonable risk of
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being caught and/or suffering some sort of punishment. The observations in the PPAC
(2009) that The Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary „seem incapable or unwilling
or both of investigating or prosecuting complex fiscal crime‟ hints at an environment
where offenders most likely perceive little risk of being caught and therefore little need
to „launder‟ their funds.
It may come as little surprise then to know that the greatest challenge facing the
PNGFIU has not been in detecting the offences and/or offenders but in determining an
effective strategy to disrupt the very large numbers of identified offenders and prevent
repetition of their offences. The PNGFIU believes that it would be unlikely to have any
measurable effect by using the process of criminal prosecution - The number of
offenders is too large, the resources of the PNGFIU too few and the court system too
slow. It is also apparent that investigation of offences committed by Government
employees is very often hampered by the inability to obtain even basic documentation
regarding the offending transactions and events.
A potential alternative to criminal prosecution is the process of restraint and forfeiture
of proceeds of crime. This process is sometimes viewed internationally as one of the
more effective methods of preventing money laundering and its predicate offences such
as corruption9, particularly so, when it concerns a country that has a „non-conviction‟
based forfeiture regime, such as that found in Papua New Guinea. The view that
restraint of proceeds of crime is a potentially effective method of deterring corruption is
possibly based upon the assumption that restraint of proceeds of crime can and will
achieve a deterrent effect. For this to occur however, a „critical mass‟ of cases would
probably need to be progressed through the court system to provide criminals (or
9

Chapter V of the UN Convention Against Corruption states „The return of assets pursuant to this chapter
is a fundamental principle of this Convention‟.
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would-be criminals) with sufficient cause for concern that they would modify their
behaviour. This critical mass of cases would likely require motivated and adequately
resourced authorities from the police through to the courts, as well as access to
sufficient information, intelligence and evidence to identify and support cases. All of
this, assumes a functioning public service.

PNG has (at the time of writing) seen four „restraint of proceeds‟ actions under the
POCA since commencing such actions in December 2009. These have generated little
in the way of media coverage or apparent deterrent effect10. Furthermore, restraining
proceeds of crime in an environment like PNG can place the people conducting the
investigations at risk of personal injury.

After much consideration of alternatives, the PNGFIU assessed that the most practicable
method of addressing corruption and fraud might be to address the largest (though
perhaps unwitting) facilitators or „gatekeepers‟ of corruption and fraud – the
commercial banks.

PNG has only four commercial banks. The largest of these holds most of the personal
accounts of Government employees and many of the Government trust accounts, which
are a regular victim of fraud.

10

The company that forfeited the PGK1.3 million by consent received a further PGK 2 million
Government payment only a few months later.
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In support of this method, is the work of the International Centre for Asset Recovery
(ICAR)11. The ICAR Practitioner‟s Handbook on Tracing Stolen Assets suggests that, in
relation to the use of the criminal offence of money laundering, with regard to financial
institutions;

„If they know, or if they must assume that the assets entrusted to them are the
proceeds of a (serious) crime and do not refrain from accepting or transferring
them they will be held criminally liable .... Reminding them of their possible
criminal liability for money laundering can be a powerful tool….‟ (ICAR,2009)

This advice is offered by ICAR was in relation to encouraging cooperation in asset
tracing investigations, the PNGFIU used this concept in a rather more direct fashion by
relying on sections 34 and 35 of the POCA.
In December 2009, the PNGFIU sought advice from the Department of Justice and
Attorney General on whether a Cash Dealer that receives a suspicious Government
cheque could be prosecuted under S35 of the POCA. Specifically, whether a bank that
receives a cheque, „receives‟, „possesses‟ or „disposes of‟ the funds. The response was
in the affirmative, and the advice went on to say that the FIU could consider issuing a
guideline detailing when the FIU would be likely to seek prosecution ie. when it would
be reasonable to suspect (that money is the proceeds of crime).12 - Advice that the
PNGFIU made use of in formulating a guideline which is the basis of „Method 2‟,
discussed below.

11

Part of the Basel Institute on Governance

12

Email from PNG Department of Justice and Attorney-General to PNGFIU 4 December 2009
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Method 1: Significant Cash Transaction Reports
The first method of addressing corruption was to use Cash Transaction Reports to
identify public servants conducting transactions indicative of corruption and raise the
perceived risk of being identified and detected. Specifically to identify public servants
who were repeatedly making large deposits well in excess of their legitimate earnings
and inform them that their transactions had been observed.

The PNGFIU convened a series of meetings with the commercial banks under the
banner of an “AML Working Group”,13,14. This Working Group provided the platform
for commencement of receipt of cash transaction and international funds transfer reports
The reports were then analysed to identify people who had their addresses recorded as
„C/-„ a Government department. This analysis provided a significant number of
Government employees who were repeatedly depositing amounts well in excess of their
yearly salary directly into their own accounts with no attempt to hide the transactions.
Additionally, some of the people identified through this process had come to notice
previously for their involvement in non-legitimate disbursements from Government
accounts which had been the subject of successful restraint action by the PNGFIU.

Having identified these transactions the PNGFIU needed a method of definitively
differentiating legitimate from illegitimate transactions and, more importantly, a method
13

so named to engender a sense of shared responsibility amongst the banks for preventing money
laundering – an attempt that was reasonably successful
14

The AML Working Group provided the direction for a number of initiatives the PNGFIU put into
practice over the next two years. These included electronic reporting of STRs; sharing of STRs with all of
the banks to reduce „bank shopping‟ by offenders; working with the Central Bank on enhanced due
diligence; provision of a Fraud Methodology Report; and the Guideline on Government Cheques and
Payments
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of raising the perception that these transactions were being observed and to continue
them might be a risky prospect.

With offenders spread across the country, and insufficient resources to travel, the
PNGFIU decided to request that the banks question their customers. The PNGFIU sent
the list of names to the relevant bank and provided the impetus for the banks to
undertake questioning of their customers by advising the bank that the PNGFIU
suspected the transactions to involve the proceeds of crime –thereby triggering the
potential for prosecution of the bank under S35 of the POCA15 if the bank facilitated
similar transactions by the same customers without first ensuring that the transactions
are legitimate.
The banks were requested to interview the customers to assure themselves (and the FIU)
that the funds were legitimate. After some further negotiation, the most affected bank
placed a number of the identified accounts on alert, questioned a number of account
holders and commenced reporting STRs on the identified persons.

The banks first questioned their customers in early May 2010, around this same time a
number of newspaper and television advertisements on the Proceeds of Crime Act were
run in the three national newspapers. A number of people identified and questioned
about their transactions by the banks modified their transaction behaviour immediately,
with some ceasing the suspicious transaction activity entirely.

15

Section 35 states “A person who receives, possesses, conceals, disposes of or brings into Papua New
Guinea money, or other property, that may reasonably be suspected of being proceeds of crime is guilty
of an offence”.
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The newspaper advertisements that ran were placed by the PNGFIU and funded by the
Department of Justice. The advertisements explained the reasons why the banks were
querying customers on their transactions and had the dual effect of modifying the
behaviour of bank staff and customers – encouraging bank staff to be active in
identifying and rejecting suspicious transactions and providing them with a basis upon
which to do it. Attachment 1 is a copy of one of these advertisements and 2 the same
advertisement in Tok Pisin. One of the banks later turned this advertisement into posters
displayed in their branches.

Unfortunately the bank didn‟t close or suspend any accounts at this first stage and it
rejected only a few transactions. Some of the Government employees conducting these
transactions continued for many more months and some of those who stopped initially,
later re-commenced and were again the topic of discussion between the PNGFIU and
the bank. On 3 June 2011, senior management of the most affected bank agreed to
commence a process of suspending and closing offender‟s accounts and on 23 June put
in place a process to prevent cashing of Government cheques over a certain threshold by
Government employees or their representatives.

At the time of writing the PNGFIU is still providing list of Government employees to
the banks, however, the names seen in the early stages no longer appear and the
amounts being deposited are significantly smaller. The amount of corruption disrupted
through this process is difficult to determine as offenders may have merely changed
their methodology but is estimated to be in the vicinity of K20 million to date.
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Method 2: Guideline on Government Cheque Due Diligence
Despite the large and frequent transactions conducted by Government employees being
a problem, that issue pales in comparison to the issue of fraud and corruption
conducting using Government issued cheques.
As the APG and World Bank noted during the AML/CTF mutual evaluation process;
“Laundering the proceeds of large scale public sector corruption in PNG
consistently indicate direct placement in the banking sector” (APG/World Bank,
2011, P103)

From meetings with banks in the AML Working Group the banks made it clear that,
while they may have been processing Government cheques that had been obtained
through illegal means, they did not have the staff, skills nor systems to allow them to do
otherwise. They were not able to effectively differentiate between the legitimate and
illegitimate cheques and were not in a position to vet every transaction involving a
Government cheque. (One bank suggested on more than one occasion that perhaps they
could report every Government cheque as a Suspicious Transaction and let the PNGFIU
sort them out)

The PNGFIU is vested with both the requirement to enforce the Proceeds of Crime Act
as well as train banks and other Cash Dealers, however it is somewhat hampered by an
inability to impose any form of effective sanction on a Cash Dealer other than criminal
prosecution.

The PNGFIU is mindful that prosecution for a money laundering offence is a very blunt
tool and could place a bank‟s correspondent banking relationships in jeopardy, possibly
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leading to the collapse of the bank.16 Under these circumstances prosecuting a bank for
money laundering did not present a feasible solution without first attempting to modify
banking processes through other less confrontational means.
Wearing the twin hats of regulator and trainer the PNGFIU offered to prepare a
guideline outlining some basic methods for identifying illegitimate transactions and
conducting due diligence on Government cheques. The guideline outlined the minimum
processes that a bank would have to undertake to be able to show that it was acting in
good faith in attempting to ensure the cheques they processed were legal. The intention
of the PNGFIU in issuing the Guideline was to encourage the banks to cease facilitation
of fraudulent transactions without having to prosecute them.
Drafting of the guideline started in late 2009, went through 8 drafts, was discussed at
numerous meetings and was the subject of considerable correspondence and debate.
Attachment 3 is a copy of the „Guideline on „Due Diligence In Relation To Government
Cheques and Payments‟ issued by the PNGFIU on 2 June 2011. It applies to
Government cheques and payments with a value of more than K2 million (AUD
800,000).
The banks did not accept the guideline without negotiation – understandably so, as the
Guideline enunciates the increased burden the banks were now being placed under in
order to avoid committing offences under the POCA.

16

FATF Recommendation 7 states “Financial institutions should, in relation to cross-border
correspondent banking and other similar relationships, in addition to performing normal due diligence
measures: a) Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand fully the nature of
the respondent‟s business and to determine from publicly available information the reputation of the
institution and the quality of supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or
terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action. b) Assess the respondent institution‟s anti-money
laundering and terrorist financing controls.
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After reading the first draft the banks expressed some concern about the volume of
documentation to be retained and subsequently an amendment was made to reduce this
burden. The banks also expressed concern that they were „becoming policemen‟.17.
Later, one of the banks responded that while it had „no reservations in adopting the
guideline‟ however they expressed the opinion that the POCA „does not impose any
obligation for compliance of these guidelines by cash dealers‟. Furthermore, „the only
obligation under the POCA is for cash dealers to report suspect transactions to the
PNGFIU‟ and „it is the PNGFIU and the police generally who are empowered to take
action relating to proceeds of crime‟.18
The PNGFIU‟s response19 highlighted to the bank in question that the PNGFIU did
indeed intend to take action on the proceeds of crime, though perhaps not by the
traditional methods envisaged by the bank when drafting their response.
The PNGFIU response included advice that the PNGFIU considered that a bank not
only had the right but the obligation to seek any and all information and documentation
sufficient to ensure itself that the funds it receives are not sourced from the proceeds of
crime.
The response also indicated that the requirement imposed by the POCA on the Cash
Dealers to know a customer‟s business, identify the ultimate beneficiary, and to train
staff to recognise money laundering transactions placed Cash Dealers in a position

17

The PNGFIU were advised in late 2010 in a meeting with an IMF consultant that banks expressing an
opinion that they are doing the work of the police is not uncommon in jurisdictions with newly introduced
or enforced AML legislation.
18

Letter to OIC PNGFIU dated 4 March 2011

19

Letter from OIC PNGFIU dated 17 May 2011
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where they are required to actively indentify transactions relating to proceeds of crime
not merely report suspicious transactions that may become aware of.
The issuing of the Guideline had an immediate impact. On 23 June 2011 senior
management of the most affected bank issued a notice to its branches that no cash
transactions relating to Government payments would be paid to Government employees
or representatives. On 30 June the same bank placed an advertisement in the newspapers
advising that „special clearance‟ on cheques would no longer be allowed and that all
cheques would have to clear in the normal timeframe20. (The National Newspaper, 30
June 2011, page 10) („special clearance‟ having been identified as a „red flag‟ in the
guideline).
The issuing of the Guideline triggered a response in the media commencing with an
article titled “Banks Join Fraud War”21. The article observed ,
„Commercial banks and financial institutions are being corralled in to assist in
the fight against fraud and corruption in government‟. (Kolma, July 19, 2011)
A later article stated that the Guideline was:
“actually aimed at abrogating the responsibility and liability of the government
in terms of ensuring good governance” (Kolma, 29 July 2011, The National
Newspaper)
A later radio interview included the opinion that:

20

21

The advertisement stated that „this change is to assist us in protecting your interests‟
19 July, The National Newspaper
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“it's not the role of the banks to ensure there is transparency and accountability with
government expenditure”(Radio Australia, 1 August 2011)
Further media articles questioned whether the guideline sought to:
“abrogate the governance responsibility of government and the duties of the Financial
Intelligence Unit (FIU) to investigate money laundering into the financial system”
(Kolma, 5 August 2011)
The legitimate point of contention alluded to in these reports relates to the level of
responsibility that banks might be required to bear to ensure that the transactions they
process are not facilitating crime.
It is arguable that in an environment where corruption is not systemic this responsibility
is low. However, in an environment like PNG where „huge sums of public money‟ are
misappropriated by all levels of Government, the responsibility of a bank to ensure it
isn‟t facilitating corruption perhaps should be a little higher.
Furthermore, the consequence of not acting to prevent transactions in each of the
circumstances is very different. A bank in a developed country like Australia that fails
to prevent the placement of drug proceeds into the banking system is less likely to
impact on the „viability and stability of the nation and health and welfare of its citizens‟.
For a bank that facilitates (or is used to facilitate) grand corruption in a country like
PNG, that risk is considerably higher, particularly where such transactions are repeated
week after week, year after year. As such banks in such environments should arguably
be held to a higher standard of accountability.
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Ultimately, however the question of the level of responsibility of banks for the
transactions that they engage in may have to be resolved, in Papua New Guinea at least,
by the courts. The Guideline provides a direction to the banks, as the Department of
Justice put it, as to „when the FIU would be likely to seek prosecution‟ and when it is
reasonable to suspect that the funds they handle are the proceeds of crime. It also, as the
APG and World Bank noted;
„reflects the priority on combating the proceeds of corruption through the banking
sector and while it does not create new obligations, it does provide guidance on
high risk scenarios and makes explicit a number of implicit primary obligations
contained in POCA. The draft Guideline provides further in-depth guidance on
practical implementation of the CDD obligations included in the POCA in the
context of accepting government cheques and payments, including „red flags‟.

(APG/World Bank, 2011, p102)
It is therefore not unreasonable to expect that the courts may refer to the Guideline in
deciding whether a particular transaction was money laundering.
It is acknowledged that Cash Dealers in PNG (as in many countries) are placed the
difficult position of appropriately responding to transactions that they suspect to be the
source or application of proceeds of crime. Legislation requires them to identify such
transactions but simultaneously makes handling such funds illegal.
At the time of writing the PNGFIU had not yet commenced process to prosecute any of
the banks under the POCA. That option always remains an open but will no doubt be a
last resort dependent due to the potential catastrophic effect such action could have
upon the bank.

Page | 26

The most affected bank and the PNG central bank (the Bank of Papua New Guinea)
responded to the Guideline by commencing a process to implement elements of the
Guideline which at the time of writing had lead to the identification and disruption of
several tens of millions in illegitimate payments. No attempt has been made to quantify
the ongoing deterrent effect of such disruption however it is believed to be significant.

Conclusion: Lessons Learned - Merging Forensic Accounting
Practice with Teaching and Research
The PNGFIU is attempting to break the cycle of systemic corruption in Papua New
Guinea in an environment pervaded by a „collapsed public service‟ using innovative
processes developed from anti money laundering legislation that don‟t rely on the
criminal justice system or cooperation from the agencies of the public service; or
require significant funding. The skills and knowledge to do this have covered the
forensic accounting spectrum, from technical investigative skills, data manipulation and
analysis, legislative interpretation, legal analysis, and negotiation.
The legislation available to the PNGFIU suffers from having been drafted based upon
laws intended to prevent laundering of the proceeds of international drug crime. That
has not prevented the PNGFIU using it with good effect and hopefully providing the
catalyst for a longer-term reduction in corruption.
PNG shares problems such as lax governance and high levels of fraud and corruption
with other developing countries. As such, the processes developed by the PNGFIU may
be transferable to them with some modification. In this context, the assistance that
forensic accounting research and teaching might offer has the potential to significant.
To be really useful, solutions developed to address corruption need to be contextPage | 27

specific and embody an appreciation of the difficulties that face practitioners operating
in the environment.
There is no doubt that the authors of this report have benefited from skills learned in
formal training, including studies in accounting, financial investigation and forensic
accounting. Obtaining this sort of training, however, has its challenges. There is a
scarcity of research and courses available that deal with the investigation or disruption
of corruption in developing countries using AML methodology.
Research conducted by groups such as the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering
and FATF is, quite rightly, focussed on laundering typologies and prevention of
corruption through application of the FATF Recommendations. At the other end of the
spectrum, groups such as Transparency International focus on methods of deterring
corruption by exposing corrupt practices and informing civil society. Between these two
styles of corruption fighting there may be a niche for forensic accounting to fill by
providing methods of deterring corruption through means similar to those developed by
the PNGFIU.
It is acknowledged that the processes currently being used in Papua New Guinea to
begin to address corruption will need to be constantly modified as criminal behaviour
changes. Successful modification will require a detailed knowledge of current criminal
behaviour, the application of relevant legislation and, more problematically,
identification and implementation of effective methods of disruption.
Some of the training that is available on AML methodology is based on the assumption,
for example, that offenders will have used complex methods of laundering as found in
developed countries. Less often is training provided that gives practitioners skills to
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generate strategies and methods of preventing, disrupting or reducing large-scale grand
corruption as found in Papua New Guinea. Research into forensic accounting in the
developing country context has the potential to produce the types of valuable insights
required to assist future practitioners to develop these skills. Improvements in forensic
accounting practice through the teaching and sharing of these insights may have the
potential to contribute significantly to the fight against corruption and a reduction in
poverty and suffering in developing countries such as Papua New Guinea.
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